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1. Introduction 
 
Globalization and easy access to information and communication technologies allow 
firms to organize their activity and choose their production strategies in a global 
framework (UNCTAD, 2004). Whether they are purchasing intermediate goods and 
services from foreign suppliers or locating parts of the production process in other 
countries through foreign direct investment (FDI), their objective is to maximize 
production value. The goal of modern sourcing strategies is to obtain the optimum 
combination of inputs from a variety of opportunities available in the global market. 
Both the location factor and the choice between the internalization or externalization 
of the means of procurement will vary with circumstances and will change over time 
(Buckley and Ghauri, 2004) 
 
The sourcing of intermediate goods and services provides firms with a decision 
making challenge (Helpman, 2006; Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Antràs and 
Helpman, 2004). The firm has to consider two dimensions: the first is ownership - the 
producer must decide whether to undertake the activity in-house or purchase the 
input or service from outside, through the market (at arm’s length); the second is 
geography - that is, whether production can be performed domestically or in a foreign 
country. The interaction of these two dimensions leads to four possibilities: insource 
at home, outsource at home, insource abroad or outsource abroad.  
 
This paper examines the characteristics of firms that might influence their foreign 
vertical integration in intermediate inputs by exploiting a unique firm-level offshoring 
dataset. The data we employ are drawn from a longitudinal survey of Spanish 
manufacturing firms (Survey on Business Strategies, ESEE). The dataset comprises 
more than 8,000 observations, corresponding to an average of 2,015 firms per year 
during the period 2006 to 2009. This survey furnishes an extraordinary opportunity to 
test the predictions made in the literature regarding foreign integration.  
 
The contribution of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of the firms’ 
characteristics that can influence their foreign integration strategy. Employing various 
strands of the literature, we investigate the role that intensity in headquarter services 
(Antràs and Helpman, 2004), international experience (Caves, 2007) and product 
differentiation (Grossman and Helpman, 2002) play in offshoring sourcing strategies. 
This paper makes the following contributions to the current empirical literature: first, 
factors that impact on a firm’s offshoring foreign integration, especially intensity in 
2
  
headquarter services, have received little attention to date in the empirical literature. 
Although a number of recent papers, including Corcos et al. (2012), Federico (2012) 
and Jabbour (2012) do address this issue, here we use a full set of variables that 
strengthen considerably the analysis that headquarter services play in foreign vertical 
integration. Second, although some evidence has been reported to illustrate the 
relationship between offshoring and international experience (Tomiura, 2005; Görg, 
Hanley and Strobl, 2008 and Wagner, 2010), the availability of empirical studies that 
analyze how international business experience specifically impacts the probability of 
foreign integration activities is still very limited. Third, the issue of differentiation has 
not been sufficiently analyzed elsewhere in the field. Here, however, the availability of 
information related to differentiation enables us to test Grossman and Helpman’s 
(2002) theoretical proposition. Fourth, our dataset provides a unique opportunity to 
analyze the characteristics of firms involved in offshoring activities distinguishing 
those that engage in foreign outsourcing from those involved in foreign vertical 
integration. To date very few studies have enjoyed access to this degree of 
information disaggregation. A notable exception is Jabbour (2010) who considers the 
effect of offshoring on a firm’s productivity and profitability using a survey that also 
permits the governance mode to be identified.  
 
In line with most recent empirical studies we conduct our analysis at the firm level. 
Antràs and Helpman (2004) assume that capital/labor intensity are determined by 
industry factors but, as Tomiura et al. (2011) show, substantial differences are to be 
found in capital intensity between firms within the same industry. Indeed, firm level 
analysis seems particularly appropriate for studying offshoring “make or buy 
decisions” given the degree of variation in a number of key firm characteristics, 
including capital intensity and skill intensity (Corcos et al., 2012). Greenaway and 
Kneller (2007) also conclude that the combination of sunk costs and the 
heterogeneity in the underlying characteristics of firms accounts for differences in 
their globalization strategies.  
 
Finally, this paper controls for headquarter and subsidiary firms. Our firm level data 
provide information related to equity participation by other companies, thereby 
enabling us to build a restricted sample that we can consider headquarter firms. This 
is a notable step forward given that most studies of foreign sourcing fail to take this 
distinction into account, with the exception of the recent contributions of Kohler and 
Smolka (2011) and Nunn and Trefler (2012). 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the main theoretical 
approaches and the empirical literature, Section 3 describes the database and 
outlines the econometric methodology and Section 4 reports the estimation results 
and discussion. The paper ends with a summary and conclusions.  
 
2. Offshore sourcing strategies 
 
Present-day theories of firms’ organizational strategies concern themselves with 
transaction costs, asset specificity and incomplete contracts. Thus, explanations of 
qualitative and quantitative changes in foreign trade and in FDI focus their attention 
on the organizational strategies adopted by firms and attempt to determine what 
activities are carried out within firms (foreign subsidiaries) as opposed to through 
market transactions (international outsourcing) and the reasons underpinning their 
choices. As foreign vertically integrated firms can be seen simply as vertically 
integrated firms whose production units are located abroad, theoretical models of 
vertical integration should be equally applicable (Caves, 2007). Coase’s (1937) 
seminal work observed that as firms grow the cost of organizing additional 
transactions increases and, eventually, the entrepreneur may fail to allocate 
production factors efficiently since managing all the information is never 
straightforward, and so the loss in resources will be greater than the cost of 
completing the transaction through the market.  
 
Taking Coase’s main principles as his starting point, Williamson (1975, 1985) 
examines the nature and determinants of transaction costs. Under market 
mechanisms, ex ante costs are incurred in finding trading parties and in negotiating 
incentives for given quantities and specifications of intermediate products. The 
search can prove expensive and difficulties are frequently encountered when seeking 
to demonstrate the attributes and quality of certain components. These costs make 
any real contract inevitably incomplete and, as such, it must be renegotiated and ex 
post adaptation will be necessary. If a party to a contract has incurred sunk costs in 
developing specific assets, the other party can opportunistically appropriate a part of 
the payoff from the investment and hence the parties will find it very difficult to switch 
partners. Such contractual limitations can lead to problems, such as delivery delays 
(holdups), given that the supplier might even reduce the amount of product to avoid 
excessive risk and so as to acquire greater bargaining power. As Kedia and 
Mukherjee (2009) emphasize, these costs can increase substantially when a firm is 
operating in a foreign country.   
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Williamson (2005) stresses two dimensions that are relevant in determining the mode 
of governance: first, asset specificity and, second, the disturbances to which 
transactions are subject. Asset specificity (which can take several forms, including 
physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, site specificity or brand name 
capital, among others) is considered high when it has value within the context of a 
particular transaction but it has relatively little value outside this transaction, thus 
leaving the door open to opportunism. As the degree of asset specificity increases, 
bilateral dependency (between the contractor and supplier) also increases, which 
when combined with the uncertainty of incomplete contracts makes vertical 
integration more pervasive. Internalization occurs when the degree of asset 
specificity and uncertainty becomes so high that the parties need a high level of 
cooperation and adaptation.  
 
Based on Williamson’s work, Grossman and Hart (1986) developed the property 
rights approach (or incomplete contracts approach), which is concerned with costly 
contracts. Their theory stresses that ownership provides the power to exercise 
control through the purchase of residual rights, which means the right to control all 
aspects of the asset not made explicit in the contract. Thus, a firm should purchase 
all the residual rights when it is too difficult to specify all the particular characteristics 
that the asset possesses. Because of contractual incompleteness and asset 
specificity, the investing parties cannot collect all the returns from their investment. 
Hence, the level of investment falls short of efficiency and an ex ante holdup problem 
of underinvestment emerges, because the agents are less inclined to invest in 
specific assets if they do not own them. In other words, the allocation of ownership 
rights will affect the level of investment. According to this theory, integration is optimal 
when production is intensive in the input that the firm owns. In this case 
subcontracting in the market means giving the external supplier the power to threaten 
the firm by withholding its assets.  
 
Grossman and Helpman (2002), Antràs (2003), Antràs and Helpman (2004) and 
Helpman (2006) consider transaction costs, asset specificity and incomplete 
contracts to play an important role in the “make or buy decision”. Antràs (2003) 
interprets a multinational firm’s inputs in terms of capital and develops a model in 
which vertical integration of suppliers occurs mostly in capital-intensive industries and 
intra-firm trade flows mostly between capital-abundant countries. In Antràs and 
Helpman (2004), a multinational firm’s input is referred to as headquarter services, 
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and the hypothesis implies that FDI is most prevalent in industries in which 
headquarter services, such as R&D, are most intensive. 
 
Antràs and Helpman (2004) combine heterogeneity of firms (Antràs, 2003) with the 
property-rights approach to the theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Based 
on assumptions of incomplete contracts and relationship-specific investment, their 
model considers two types of transaction: vertical integration and outsourcing. In the 
scenario in which a firm chooses vertical integration, should the holdup problem not 
be resolved via bargaining, its outside options are enhanced by obtaining the residual 
rights of control. The final producer moreover can appropriate higher fractions of 
revenue under vertical integration than under outsourcing because it has rights of 
control over inputs.  
 
Antràs and Helpman (2004) also assume a hierarchical order for the fixed costs 
associated with sourcing activities. Organizational forms are faced by two tensions: 
the first concerns location, where fixed costs are higher for foreign sourcing than for 
domestic sourcing; the second concerns the governance mode, where fixed costs are 
higher for insourcing than they are for outsourcing. The authors claim that insourcing 
means the production of intermediate inputs has to be controlled, thereby increasing 
managerial costs. In choosing between vertical integration and outsourcing the final 
goods producer trades off the benefits of ownership against the benefits of incentives 
for the independent supplier.  
 
Antràs and Helpman’s model predicts the different sourcing choices based on a firm’s 
productivity: thus, the most productive firms pursue foreign integration; firms with high 
productivity engage in foreign outsourcing to an unrelated supplier; firms with low 
productivity choose domestic insourcing from a vertically integrated supplier; while 
the least productive firms choose domestic outsourcing. In their sector analysis, the 
prevalence of organizational forms depends on the industry characteristics and the 
degree of productivity dispersion across firms: in component intensive sectors (with 
very low intensity of headquarter services) no firms integrate. In headquarter 
intensive sectors all organizational forms are possible, but integration is more 
prevalent in sectors with higher firm productivity and in those with higher headquarter 
intensity. As a result, only the most productive firms capture the market share 
required to offset the high costs of vertical integration, but not all candidates for 
vertical integration will in fact integrate. The real candidates for vertical integration will 
be highly productive firms, with a large share of their inputs being provided by their 
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headquarters. Taking these studies as our starting point, we expect foreign 
integration to be more pervasive the greater the multinational firm’s input intensity is 
in headquarter services and the higher its productivity. 
 
The few empirical studies that examine the determinants of foreign integration at the 
firm level support the above hypothesis. Some of these papers center their attention 
on intensity in headquarter services and the choice of sourcing mode. Marin (2006) 
shows that intra-firm imports between German firms and their subsidiaries grow when 
the parent firm is more intensive in headquarter services (R&D) and when the 
distance is lower, while intra-firm imports between Austrian firms and their 
subsidiaries grow when the parent firm is more capital intensive and less R&D 
intensive. Corcos et al. (2012) find that highly productive, capital and skill-intensive 
firms favor intra-firm trade. Ito et al. (2011) examine the influence of knowledge 
capital on sourcing behaviour. Their results show that R&D intensity and patenting 
contribute to offshore sourcing and increase the probability of engaging in vertical 
integration as opposed to outsourcing. Federico (2012) shows that foreign integration 
is positively related to a firm’s capital intensity and Jabbour (2012) also reports 
evidence that the intensity of headquarter services can increase the probability of 
foreign vertical integration at the expense of foreign outsourcing. 
 
Some studies focus primarily on productivity and choice of governance mode. 
Tomiura (2007) finds that firms integrating part of their activities abroad are more 
productive than foreign outsourcers and exporters, which in turn are more productive 
than domestic firms. Fariñas & Martín-Marcos (2010) conclude that high-productivity 
firms source intermediate inputs in international markets, whereas low-productivity 
firms acquire them at home. Federico (2010) and Kohler and Smolka (2011) provide 
empirical evidence for the sourcing strategies and heterogeneity of firms. Both 
papers find that productivity levels are generally higher (lower) for firms pursuing 
foreign integration (domestic outsourcing).  
 
International experience also influences the offshoring mode of the firms. As the cost 
of information increases, a firm becomes less willing to acquire it and, hence, the 
perceived risk of foreign integration is greater while other options appear more 
attractive. The accumulation of foreign experience is costly and as such international 
experience represents a transaction cost advantage for multinational firms. Moreover, 
firms perform better when they are able to gather information via a learning process, 
which usually starts as an extension of domestic activities in similar, nearby host 
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countries. Starting with exports, firms can obtain more information on overseas 
suppliers via their dealings with foreign countries. This information minimizes the 
costs of inexperience when investing in a foreign country. The acquisition of 
successive incremental steps in experience has been demonstrated to be a more 
successful process than one in which a firm becomes directly involved in a foreign 
integration project without previous experience (Caves, 2007). 
 
In particular, multinational companies obtain advantages through both vertical and 
horizontal integration. They are able to segment their activities and to seek the 
optimal location for each activity. At the same time, multinational enterprises are also 
able to coordinate these activities by using a wide variety of mechanisms ranging 
from wholly owned FDI, through joint ventures, licensing and subcontracting (Buckley 
and Ghauri, 2004; Buckley, 2009). Foreign firms, which are assumed to be part of 
larger multinational companies, can be expected to use higher levels of technology, 
information and business experience than those employed by domestic firms 
because they have easier access to the parent firm’s specific assets. Supply chain 
management has emerged as an important factor in the competitive success of 
multinational enterprises: a firm’s relationships with the parent firm and other 
subsidiaries abroad facilitate the disintegration of production structures (Girma and 
Görg, 2004). Based on these studies, it is our assertion that firms with more 
international business experience can be expected to prefer foreign integration as 
their governance mode. 
 
Most empirical studies of international experiences have focused their attention on 
offshoring, albeit not specifically on foreign integration. Tomiura (2005), Görg, Hanley 
and Strobl (2008) and Wagner (2010) show that exports increase the probability of 
offshoring activities. Tomiura (2005) also reports empirical evidence for the offshoring 
activities of multinationals. His estimations show that firms with their own overseas 
affiliates are four times more likely than firms without experience in FDI to choose 
foreign offshoring. Empirical evidence of international experience specifically in 
sourcing through foreign integration is low. To the best of our knowledge, only Ito et 
al. (2011) show a significant positive relationship between export activity and foreign 
integration.  
 
Differentiation is also important in foreign “make or buy decisions”. Grossman and 
Helpman (2002) identify the industrial conditions that favor vertical integration or 
outsourcing as the equilibrium mode of organization, emphasizing technology, the 
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distribution of bargaining power between intermediate and final goods producers, the 
size of the economy and the degree of substitutability between an industry’s 
consumer products. There are two channels via which final product substitution might 
affect the relative cost of the two alternative organizational modes.  
 
One channel is the degree of competition in the final goods industry. The effect of this 
competition on the viability of vertical integration or outsourcing is not direct but 
depends rather on the difference between the cost disadvantages derived from the 
diseconomies of scope and the distortion derived from imperfect contracting. When 
specialized final producers are able to sell their output at a lower price than that set 
by their vertically integrated counterparts - a situation that comes about because the 
former enjoy sufficient cost advantages to offset search frictions and holdup 
problems, then their potential operating profits will be proportionally greater. In other 
words, a greater elasticity of demand for final goods increases the relative viability of 
outsourcing. By contrast, when vertically integrated firms can sell their output at a 
lower price than that offered by specialized final producers - a situation that arises 
because specialized producers with an imperfect contract only obtain part of the 
operating profit, yet they must bear all the costs of producing the intermediate good, 
the component firms produce smaller quantities than are needed to maximize profits, 
which generates inefficiencies and holdup problems that raise the prices of 
specialized final producers relative to those charged by vertical integrated producers. 
In such circumstances, the viability of vertical integration clearly increases. 
 
The other channel is the number of specialized intermediate producers that enter the 
industry. When markets are highly competitive owing to the fact that products are 
highly substitutable, the number of firms that enter to produce specialized 
components remains relatively small. This situation occurs because under incomplete 
contracts, a producer of components bears all the costs of producing the intermediate 
good (see discussion above); thus, as the final goods producer obtains a proportion 
of total revenues as profit, the components producer obtains only the remaining 
fraction of this revenue, less the variable costs, an amount that is dependent on the 
elasticity of substitution. Thus, the greater the substitutability of the final products, the 
smaller the number of specialized component producers we find entering the market, 
thereby increasing the firm’s probability of finding a partner and its likelihood of 
outsourcing. Note that if contracts were not incomplete, an increase in the elasticity of 
substitution would affect final and intermediate good producers alike. The combined 
effect of the two variables on outsourcing is ambiguous; thus, while the number of 
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providers favors outsourcing, the degree of competition in the industry has no 
obvious effect. When the degree of substitutability of final goods is high, the 
prevalence of outsourcing requires a sufficiently high cost advantage to offset search 
frictions and holdup problems. 
 
Transaction-specific investments tend to be required when the production process 
involves non-standardized inputs as is the case of differentiated products (Levy, 
1985). If a firm develops such products, the risk of opportunism increases when it 
shares this knowledge with other host country firms, given that the acquisition of this 
knowledge might enable the latter to operate independently. This risk of opportunism 
is especially significant in the case of international transactions because legal and 
social systems may well differ (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992). Therefore, when a 
firm is able to differentiate its products, greater control modes may be more efficient.  
 
Product differentiation is also important when a firm has to choose its international 
distribution channel. Foreign integration, as opposed to an independent distribution 
channel, is more profitable for the manufacturer when its final products are highly 
differentiated, as such products do not compete directly. By contrast, when the 
degree of substitutability and competition are high, price wars can reduce the 
manufacturers’ profits in vertically integrated firms; however, here manufacturers can 
protect their profits if these products are sold through independent channels. Indeed, 
Coughlan (1985) and Anderson and Coughlan (1987) present evidence of the fact 
that highly differentiated products are more likely to be sold through integrated 
channels. Taking these findings into account, we would expect a positive relation 
between product differentiation and foreign vertical integration although, as we have 
shown, literature reports are inconclusive. 
 
3. Data and Model 
 
3.1. Data 
 
The dataset we use is the Survey on Business Strategies (Encuesta Sobre 
Estrategias Empresariales, henceforth ESEE) which has been conducted yearly 
since 1990 by the SEPI foundation on behalf of the Spanish Ministry of Industry. This 
survey gathers information from manufacturing firms operating in Spain employing 
more than nine workers. The annual survey comprises extensive information on 
around 2,000 companies (see http://www.funep.es/esee/en/ for a more detailed 
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description of the database). The sampling procedure ensures representativeness for 
each two-digit NACE manufacturing sector, following both exhaustive and random 
sampling criteria. In the initial year (1990) all firms employing more than 200 
employees were required to participate and a sample of firms employing between 10 
and 200 workers were selected using a stratified, proportional, restricted and 
systematic sampling method with a random start. In order to guarantee a high level of 
representativeness and to preserve the inference properties, newly created 
companies have been incorporated in the survey every year according to the same 
criteria. This database has been frequently used in empirical analyses (see, among 
others, González et al., 2005; Lopez, 2008) and also specifically for offshoring and 
outsourcing analyses (Fariñas and Marcos, 2010; Kohler and Smolka, 2011)  
 
The objective of this study is to provide empirical evidence about the features that 
influence firms’ foreign vertical integration. Although the ESEE survey is particularly 
useful in this regard, it presents two main limitations: first, we are unable to study the 
location choice of the offshoring strategy as the survey provides no information about 
exporting countries; second, the survey has only provided information about 
offshoring governance modes since 2006. Therefore, for most firms included, we are 
unable to determine the year in which the decision was taken to integrate in a foreign 
country. So, while we can examine the relationships between a firm’s characteristics 
and its offshoring strategy decision, they cannot necessarily be interpreted as being 
causal.  
 
3.2. Variables 
 
Dependent variable 
 
In 2006 the ESEE survey first began to incorporate information about the firms’ 
organizational dimensions and their location. Here, we are particularly interested in 
details related to their offshoring activities. The questionnaire allows us to distinguish 
between foreign outsourcing and foreign integration in the following questions: 
 
“Indicate whether during the year (year) the company imported goods and services 
that are incorporated (transformed) in the production process and the percentage 
they represent of the total imports, according to type of supplier” (yes/no) (if yes, the 
percentage rate) 
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(1) From firms which belong to the same group and/or foreign firms participating in 
the capital of your company (yes/no) (if yes, the percentage rate) 
(2) From other foreign firms (yes/no) (if yes, the percentage rate) 
 
This information allows us to identify whether imports are intra-firm (related party) or 
at arm’s-length (non-related party) and it enables us to examine the empirical 
implications of theoretical models of the “make or buy decision”. We construct the 
dependent variable Foreign Integration (FI), which is a binary variable indicating 
whether the company imported intermediate goods and services from other 
companies belonging to its group and/or from foreign companies participating in the 
capital of the company. 
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of firms with respect to the inclusive sourcing modes 
for the period 2006-2009. On average 44 per cent of all firms engage in offshoring 
activities (extensive margin), of these 96 per cent are involved in foreign outsourcing 
and 23 per cent integrate. These percentages are notably higher than comparative 
figures for Italy where Federico (2012) shows that only 298 firms (7.7 per cent of the 
sample) purchase subcontracting inputs from abroad while in 84  per cent of these all 
foreign inputs are foreign outsourcing inputs. This relatively small proportion of 
offshoring firms is attributable to the fact that Federico only considers the 
subcontracting of custom-made inputs, while we consider a much broader definition 
of sourcing, i.e. imports of intermediate goods and services that are incorporated in 
the production process. In Japan, Tomiura et al. (2011) also report a greater 
percentage of firms with an involvement in foreign outsourcing than in foreign 
integration. The prevalence of outsourcing over integration found here is, therefore, 
consistent with the evidence reported elsewhere. 
 
If we consider exclusive offshoring modes we find that, on average, merely 1.6 per 
cent of total firms (or 3.6 of offshoring firms) integrate. As in Tomiura (2007) and in 
Kohler and Smolka (2011), these results confirm that firms active in one globalization 
mode are more likely to engage in other modes of offshoring. In Kohler and Smolka 
(2011), for example, the probability of a large firm integrating abroad increases from 
27 per cent to 36 per cent, if this firm is already engaged in foreign outsourcing.  
 
(Table 1) 
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Figure 1 shows the heterogeneity of offshoring participation by industry. In the case 
of foreign integration, the motor vehicles (34 per cent), chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals (26 per cent) and computer, electronic and optical (21 per cent) 
sectors present the highest levels of participation. This reflects the fact that these 
industries are able to segment their activities and so seek the optimal source for each 
activity. At the other extreme, we find industries with no foreign integration or with a 
very low propensity to integrate. These include beverages, food, meat, leather and 
footwear, textiles and clothing, furniture and printing, all of which are characterized by 
a low intensity in technology and in capital related to labor.  
 
(Figure 1) 
 
Table 2 shows that size matters in relation to a firm’s propensity for integration. In line 
with the theory, size reflects the capability of firms to absorb the higher costs of 
foreign activities. This is particularly notable in the case of fixed costs, where we 
assume, in line with Antràs and Helpman (2004), that the fixed costs of foreign 
integration are higher than those of foreign outsourcing. As such, large firms show a 
much greater propensity for foreign integration (39 per cent of offshoring firms) than 
that shown by small companies (11.8 per cent of offshoring firms). As for the intensity 
of foreign integration, the difference between large and small firms is not so marked 
but is higher in small firms.  
 
(Table 2) 
 
 
Independent variables 
 
Headquarter intensity: The proxies used to reflect headquarter intensity include R&D, 
skill intensity, capital intensity, design, marketing, quality control (see Antràs, 2003; 
Antràs and Helpman, 2004; Nunn and Trefler, 2008 and 2011; Corcos et al; 2012; Ito 
et al. 2011; Jabbour, 2012). To capture headquarter intensity we construct the 
following measures instead of relying on just one: skill intensity (Skill); R&D intensity 
(R&D); capital intensity (K/L), patents (Patents) and quality control (Quality). See 
Table 3 for a description of the variables and descriptive statistics. 
  
Productivity: We use labor productivity measured as the value added per worker. 
Labor productivity has the advantage of being relatively simple to construct and it is 
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one of the most frequently used measures in offshoring studies (see Girma and Görg, 
2004; Tomiura, 2007; Görg, Hanley and Strobl, 2008; Görg, Greenaway & Kneller, 
2008; Wagner, 2010; Federico, 2010 and Kohler and Smolka, 2011)  
 
International experience: To capture international experience we construct two 
measures: foreign ownership (Foreign) and export intensity (Export). We expect 
foreign ownership to increase the probability of foreign integration. Export activity 
should help to explain the probability of foreign sourcing since the experience 
accumulated by a firm in foreign markets should reduce transaction costs, thus 
favoring both foreign integration and foreign outsourcing (Federico, 2012).  
 
Product differentiation: This is a binary variable indicating the extent to which the 
products the company manufactures are differentiated. The variable indicates either 
high differentiation, when some specific investment is needed in order to attend to 
customer requirements, or low differentiation, when products are largely standard for 
all buyers as the producer has its own product range. Díaz-Mora and Triguero-Cano 
(2012) and Merino and Rodriguez (2007) also use this variable as a proxy of product 
differentiation. Although product differentiation might be introduced in other ways, 
such as by advertising, in line with Merino and Rodriguez (2007), we consider 
adaptation to customer requirements to be a major source of product differentiation. 
 
Finally we include two control variables, Age and Size. The firm’s age, defined as the 
number of years since the firm was established, is used to capture the effect of 
learning over time, a potential factor facilitating the firm’s foreign operations. Size, 
measured as the total number of staff employed, also captures the firms’ 
heterogeneity. As Tomiura (2007) claims large companies, with higher labor 
productivity, stronger headquarter functions, distribution networks, higher earnings 
and brand identification are more likely to offshore their activities.  
 
Another desirable control variable would have been a proxy for the contracting 
environment in the exporting country, as differences across destinations can be 
critical in the make or buy choice. Tomiura et al. (2011) consider the choice of 
offshoring mode to a given region, and report some remarkable differences between 
China and ASEAN countries, on the one hand, and the United States and European 
countries, on the other. Corcos et al. (2012) find that intra-firm trade is more likely 
with countries that have good judicial institutions, especially in the case of highly 
productive, capital-, skill- and headquarter-intensive firms. Yet, for the Spanish case, 
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this information is not available, although this absence of a variable for the 
contracting environment in the host country should not be a source of concern, given 
that Spain’s main supplier of imports is the European Union (EU) and the top five 
countries, Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom and the Netherlands, present 
similar institutional environments and legal systems (Kohler and Smolka, 2011). 
Similarly, for the Italian case, Federico (2012) claims that the contracting environment 
in the host country is not a problem as Italy’s foreign suppliers are mainly located in 
the EU. 
 
(Table 3) 
 
3.3. Methodological issues 
 
To carry out the empirical analysis, we use a binary dependent variable (foreign 
integration) in a probit estimation. 
 
Prob(foreign integration)it = β0 + β1(headquarter intensity)it + β2(productivity)it + 
β3(international experience)it + β4(differentiation)it + β5(Z)it +εit                     (1) 
 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm integrates 
its activities in a foreign country and zero otherwise. The subscript i refers to the unit 
of analysis, firms, and t represents time. The independent variables are described in 
detail above and εi is an error term. As is well known, the estimation of a probit model 
is preferable to an OLS estimation when the dependent variable is binary. 
 
A pooled probit estimation has been carried out (Table 4, model 1). Given the short 
period of time (four years) covered by the panel, and the fact that the relevant 
variation in the data is mostly cross-sectional, panel regression techniques are of 
limited use here. Therefore we implement a pooled data estimation over the sample 
period clustering the error terms at firm level to control for intra-firm serial correlation. 
To control for any industry specific characteristics that may affect a firm’s likelihood of 
integrating its activities abroad, a set of industry dummies (19 two-digit dummies) is 
included in both regressions. In addition, time dummies are included to control for 
cyclical effects. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
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4.1. Main results 
 
The main results from the estimation are shown in Table 4 model 1. The empirical 
analysis confirms, first, that firms with the highest intensity in their headquarter 
services are the ones most likely to be involved in activities of foreign integration. Of 
the five variables used to control headquarter service intensity, the coefficient 
associated with the capital intensity and skill variable, which capture human capital, 
are positive and significant. By contrast, the variables that capture the research and 
development activities (R&D and patents) are not significant.  
 
Our results regarding capital intensity are similar to those obtained in current 
empirical studies of the determinants of foreign integration. Corcos et al. (2012) and 
Tomiura et al. (2011) report that capital intensive firms are more likely to engage in 
foreign integration. Federico (2012), when using a set of variables to estimate the 
influence of headquarter intensity on the choice between integration or outsourcing, 
reports that the only variable to have a positive and significant influence on foreign 
integration is the capital intensity of the firm.  
 
(Table 4) 
 
Skill intensity has often been included in estimations of intra-firm characteristics, both 
at the industry and firm levels, but results have been inconclusive. Corcos et al. 
(2012) at the firm level and Nunn and Trefler (2011) and Bernard et al. (2010) at the 
industry level find that skilled labor increases the prevalence of intra-firm trade, while 
Antràs (2003), at the industry level, finds that human capital is not statistically 
significant. In this study our results support a positive relationship between human 
capital and foreign integration at the firm level.  
 
Part of the empirical literature reports a positive and significant relationship between 
research and development activities and foreign integration. For example, Antràs 
(2003) and Nunn and Trefler (2011) find that, at the industry level, R&D expenditure 
increases U.S. intra-firm imports. Ito et al. (2011) report that a firm’s R&D intensity 
and patenting are positive and significant increasing the probability of engaging in 
foreign integration. Jabbour (2012) finds that marketing services and industry R&D 
intensity (two variables used to proxy headquarter service intensity) appear positive 
and significant. However, Federico (2012) does not obtain significant values for R&D 
activity at either the firm or the industry levels. Our results suggest that human capital 
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has a stronger influence than R&D activities. Nevertheless, as discussed in the 
robustness section below, when we consider a restricted sample comprising firms 
with majority of domestic capital, then R&D activity becomes positive and significant. 
 
Our results also show that firms involved in foreign integration are more productive 
than the rest of the firms. This result is consistent with the empirical literature related 
to productivity and foreign integration. Tomiura (2007) and Ito et al. (2011) for Japan, 
Corcos et al. (2012) for France, Federico (2010 and 2012) for Italy and Kohler and 
Smolka (2011) for Spain find that productivity and foreign integration are positively 
and significantly related.  
 
Second, international experience is also seen to matter for foreign integration and the 
coefficients associated with both variables (foreign and exports) are positive and 
significant. Specifically, the variable that captures the presence of foreign capital in 
the company is highly significant demonstrating the prominence of foreign firms 
among those that engage in foreign integration. International experience was found 
to be an essential characteristic for firms engaged in foreign integration when 
conducting the estimate for the whole set of firms. As we show below in the 
robustness checks, these two variables (foreign and exports) also maintain their 
significance when we conduct the estimate just with the offshoring firms.  
 
Third, the coefficient of the differentiation variable has a positive sign and is 
significant. Thus, foreign integration is more likely when a firm develops differentiated 
products that require a superior relationship between parent and subsidiary and 
specific assets (for example, marketing, brand, technology, quality, etc.) that are 
better protected against imitation within the firm’s boundaries.  
 
Of the control variables, firm size is relevant in foreign integration. As Tomiura (2007) 
points out, larger firms have a greater capacity to cope with the higher costs of 
foreign integration. Firms need asset power to engage in international expansion, 
which is costly and size reflects the capability of a firm to absorb these costs. 
Tomiura et al. (2011) note that large firms may prefer integrated sourcing based on 
their rich internal resources within multinationals, and they report that exclusively 
insourcing firms are significantly larger than exclusively outsourcing firms. 
 
4.2. Robustness checks 
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To verify the robustness of our results we carried out four complementary 
estimations. In the first, we estimate the determinants of foreign integration using a 
restricted sample of offshoring firms only (Table 4 model 2). In the next two we 
estimate foreign integration using a restricted sample of domestic headquarter firms 
(Table 4 models 3 and 4) and, finally, in the fourth estimation we consider intensity 
(or intensive margin) instead of participation (or extensive margin) as the dependent 
variable (Table 4 model 5). 
 
Firstly, most of the firms that carry out foreign integration are also involved in foreign 
outsourcing. Therefore to analyze if the results obtained in the estimation of foreign 
integration characteristics hold also for firms involved in offshoring activities, we 
conducted a complementary estimation only for those firms that import intermediate 
goods and services (Table 4 model 2). The results are similar to the previous 
estimation (Table 4 model 1) demonstrating that the characteristics recognized for 
foreign integration also hold for the restricted sample of offshoring firms, with the sole 
exception of the variable that controls for productivity. Although most theoretical and 
empirical studies conclude that firms involved in FI are the most productive, our 
results only confirm this when the analysis compares FI firms with all other firms. By 
contrast, our results show that the productivity indicator is not significant. Likewise, 
Jabbour (2012) finds that productivity is not significant for vertical integration relative 
to outsourcing firms. The author justifies his findings by suggesting that contractual 
agreements are associated with higher fixed costs of organization in comparison to 
those associated with vertical integration, confirming the predictions of Grossman et 
al. (2005). 
 
Secondly, in the theoretical models the strategic decision as to whether to make or 
buy is taken by the parent company, who imports the intermediate inputs produced in 
the country of one of its foreign subsidiary. As Nunn and Trefler (2011) point out, it 
could be the case that these imports were shipped from a foreign parent to a 
subsidiary. Empirical studies usually lack such information, which is critical if firm 
level variables are related to intensity in headquarter services. Jabbour (2012) 
considers this to be especially important in the case of firms affiliated to a group, as it 
is difficult to know if the decision maker is the parent firm or the firm conducting the 
trade transaction. Our data, in line with Kohler and Smolka (2009), provide 
information related to equity participation by other companies, enabling us to build a 
restricted sample in which we consider domestic headquarter firms. This is a marked 
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improvement as most foreign sourcing studies do not take this difference into 
account.  
 
To control for parent firms, we assume that firms with more than 50 per cent of 
national capital are the ones that take the organizational decisions, and we run two 
Probit estimations (Table 4 models 3 and 4): the first considering firms with less than 
50 per cent of foreign capital participation, and the second reducing this threshold 
control value to less than 10 per cent of foreign capital participation. As Table 4 
shows the number of observations falls from 5,848 in model 3 when considering firms 
with less than 50 per cent of foreign capital participation, to 5,756 in model 4 when 
considering firms with less than 10 per cent of foreign capital participation. The  
difference is very small (the reduction being just 92 observations), which suggests 
that once a firm is controlled by domestic capital the rate of control becomes very 
high.  
 
Our results for the restricted domestic headquarter sample (Table 4 models 3 and 4), 
show some differences from those for the general model 1. First, we confirm that 
more productive firms and those with more intensive headquarter services are more 
likely to engage in foreign integration activities, with skill and capital intensity showing 
positive and significant coefficients, but here the coefficient associated with the R&D 
variable is also positive and significant. Therefore, for these domestic headquarter 
firms our results suggest that R&D activities are relevant in the foreign integration 
decision. Second, the coefficient associated with the differentiation variable is no 
longer significant. In this sense, it should be noted that our variable, which proxies 
differentiation, only captures product adaptability to the client and not differentiation 
understood in a much broader sense. Highly detailed information would be needed to 
explain these differences in the main estimation and in that for just domestic 
headquarter firms. 
 
The results for domestic headquarter firms also show that international experience, 
measured by export intensity, is positive and significant. However, the intensity of 
foreign participation is no longer significant. Hence, when the domestic capital is 
dominant then the intensity of foreign capital participation is not a particularly notable 
characteristic of firms involved in foreign integration activities. These results suggest 
that minority foreign capital is not relevant as a supplier of international experience, 
since it is the domestic headquarter which provides the international business 
experience. 
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Finally, in the last estimation (Table 4 model 5) we use the intensity of foreign 
integration measured as the percentage of total imports represented by imports of 
intermediate goods and services from foreign companies belonging to the firm’s 
group and/or foreign companies participating in the capital of the company. The 
estimation has been carried out using a Tobit model because the dependent variable 
ranges between 0 and 100 per cent. The results confirm those obtained for the main 
estimation (Table 4 model 1), with the exception of the coefficient associated with the 
capital intensity variable which is no longer significant. This result suggests that 
capital intensity matters particularly for the integration decision, but not as far as the 
intensity of integration is concerned. 
 
5. Concluding remarks  
 
This paper has undertaken an analysis of the characteristics that influence a firm’s 
foreign integration strategy. We examine the role that intensity in headquarter 
services, productivity levels, multinational experience and product differentiation play 
in this vertical integration sourcing mode. The dataset we employ comprises a 
longitudinal survey of Spanish manufacturing firms drawn from the Survey on 
Business Strategies (ESEE) for the period 2006 to 2009. The analysis is conducted 
at the firm level. 
 
The results provided by our study offer immediate responses to some of the 
questions we raised at the outset. First, in line with Tomiura (2007) and Kohler and 
Smolka (2011), our results confirm the fact that firms active in one globalization mode 
are more likely to be involved in other modes of offshoring. Second, as Antràs and 
Helpman (2004) predict, our estimations confirm that the real candidates for vertical 
integration are the most productive firms and those that have a large share of their 
inputs provided by headquarters. Capital- and skill-intensive firms are more likely to 
be involved in foreign integration. In this study, we present evidence that supports a 
positive and highly significant relationship between skill levels and foreign integration. 
These results also hold for domestic headquarter firms, whose capital, skill and R&D 
activities have a strong influence on their foreign integration strategy. Moreover, 
capital intensity favors the establishment of a related-company, but it has no impact 
on the intensity of foreign integration once the latter has been established. 
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Third, firms with international experience, including foreign firms and export firms, are 
more likely to engage in foreign integration - in the case of subsidiaries, because they 
enjoy easier access to the international experience of the foreign parent; and, in the 
case of exporting firms, because their foreign market experience facilitates access to 
overseas information. The acquisition of international business experience is a costly 
learning process, making the course of international expansion highly path 
dependent (Caves, 2007). Firms without any foreign market experience are likely to 
face greater problems when attempting to manage their foreign operations, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of their engaging in foreign integration activities. Our results 
for domestic headquarters show that the intensity of foreign participation is not 
significant. This result suggests that international business experience is an 
intangible asset related to ownership.  
 
Fourth, as in Grossman and Helpman’s (2002) theory, our results regarding the role 
of differentiated products are inconclusive. In some of our estimations differentiation 
appears to be a relevant characteristic of firms engaging in foreign integration. This 
suggests that the diseconomies of scope are not as great as the costs generated by 
incomplete contracts, and that the risk of opportunism in international transactions is 
high for these firms (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992). However, this is not the case 
for firms operating as domestic headquarters, where the variable capturing 
differentiation is not significant. 
 
Our results suggest that only firms with very specific characteristics are able to take 
advantage of foreign integration. Such companies are in a minority among the group 
of sourcing firms, because the higher integration costs incurred abroad have to be 
met by higher rates of productivity. These firms tend to be intensive in their 
headquarter services and they strive to retain control over their ownership specific 
advantages. At the same time they are companies with sufficient international 
experience to be able to reduce their transaction costs. Without these conditions, the 
chances of success of a foreign integration strategy are low and other sourcing 
options are better, or more efficient. 
 
In this paper we have focused our attention on the characteristics of the firms that are 
most prevalent in the foreign integration governance mode. However, a number of 
interesting points remain to be addressed in future studies. First, a better 
understanding is needed of the characteristics of the exporting country and the 
attributes of the imported inputs that determine the foreign sourcing strategy in the 
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light of existing literature on incomplete contracts. Second, the contracting 
environment in the exporting country and the associated governance mode is an 
additional aspect to investigate, as empirical evidence to date is limited and largely 
inconclusive. A third aspect of interest concerns the determinants of foreign 
integration at firm level and its ex-post effects. To further our understanding here 
would require a larger database so that we might establish the point in time when the 
firm establishes a foreign subsidiary.  
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Table 1- Inclusive offshoring modes  
(percentages of participation) 
 
  
OFF/total 
firms 
FO/total 
firms 
FI/total 
firms FO/OFF FI/OFF DO
Total 
firms 
2006 41 39 9 95 21 59 2023 
2007 45 43 10 96 23 55 2013 
2008 46 44 11 97 23 54 2009 
2009 45 44 11 97 24 55 2015 
2006-
2009 44 43 10 96 23 56 2015 
   OFF: Offshoring firms. Companies that import intermediate goods and services. 
FO: Foreign outsourcing firms. Companies that import intermediate goods and services from foreign 
firms that do not belong to the same group or participate in the capital of the company. 
FI: Foreign integration firms. Companies that import intermediate goods and services from other firms 
belonging to its group and/or foreign firms participating in the capital of the company. 
DO: Domestic firms. Companies that do not import intermediate goods and services. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Firms’ Heterogeneity: Size matters 
2006-2009 Small firms* Large firms** 
%OFF/Total firms 35,9 68,7 
% FO/OFF 97,4 93,8 
% FI/OFF 11,8 39,4 
FO intensity 73,3 64,7 
FI intensity 41,4 37,5 
 
* If the firm has fewer than 200 workers 
** If the firm has more than 200 workers 
FO and FI intensities are measured as the percentage of total imports represented by imports of 
intermediate goods and services from foreign companies that do not belong to the same group or 
participate in the capital of the company and the percentage from other companies belonging to its 
group and/or foreign companies participating in the capital of the company, respectively. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
 
Variable Description of the variable Obs. Mean SD 
FI Foreign integration. Dummy=1 if the firm 
sources abroad through foreign integration, 
0 otherwise. 
8059 0.101 0.301 
Skill  
 
Skill intensity. Percentage that senior 
engineers and graduates represent among 
the total company staff. 
9172 5.951 8.904 
R&D  R&D effort (internal R&D expenditure over 
sales).  
8046 0.007 0.022 
Patents  Number of patents registered abroad by the 
company during the year. 
8060 0.337 5.817 
Quality  
 
Quality control. Dummy=1 if the company 
has made or contracted standardization and 
quality control, 0 otherwise. 
10028 0.415 0.492 
Capital 
Intensity 
Capital stock (tangible fixed assets) divided 
by the number of employees. 
8049 10.8957 1.1844 
Productivity Value added per hour worked (in 
logarithms). 
8000 3.147 0.714 
Foreign Percentage of direct or indirect foreign 
capital in the company. 
8050 14.50 34.360 
Export  Export intensity (exports over sales) 8050 0.191 0.268 
Differentiation Product differentiation. Dummy=1 if most of 
the products manufactured by the company 
are highly differentiated, 0 otherwise. 
9112 0.419 0.493 
Size Total number of employees. 8060 221.45 723.90 
Age Number of years that the firm has been 
operating. 
18440 34.31 20.19 
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Table 4. Probit and Tobit estimations 
 Probit Probit Probit Probit Tobit
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES FI FI FI FI FI 
(intensity)
 All firms Only 
offshoring
All firms
Foreign<50%
All firms 
Foreign<10% 
All firms
Skill 0.0183*** 0.0193*** 0.0166*** 0.0168*** 0.923***
 [0.00431] [0.00499] [0.00604] [0.00613] [0.239]
R&D 2.030 1.068 3.832** 3.356* 29.96
 [1.554] [1.668] [1.736] [1.849] [102.6]
Patents 0.00276 0.000587 -0.00151 -0.000932 0.119
 [0.00402] [0.00400] [0.00409] [0.00415] [0.151]
Quality 0.0417 -0.0178 0.151 0.154 2.653
 [0.0855] [0.0968] [0.119] [0.121] [4.583]
Capital intensity 0.0770* 0.0863* 0.140*** 0.127** 2.562
 [0.0406] [0.0496] [0.0506] [0.0507] [2.277]
Productivity 0.167*** 0.0763 0.182** 0.154* 12.24***
 [0.0603] [0.0646] [0.0887] [0.0887] [3.485]
Foreign 0.0170*** 0.0183*** 0.00360 0.120 0.915***
 [0.000947] [0.00104] [0.00764] [0.128] [0.0567]
Exports 0.597*** 0.472*** 0.736*** 0.745*** 31.70***
 [0.136] [0.159] [0.166] [0.173] [7.882]
Differentiation 0.222** 0.226** 0.0337 0.0321 9.127*
 [0.0950] [0.108] [0.140] [0.144] [4.917]
Size 0.000105** 0.000184** 0.000425*** 0.000418*** 0.00446**
 [4.73e-05] [7.66e-05] [0.000116] [0.000118] [0.00207]
Age 0.000625 0.00111 0.00117 0.00133 0.0247
 [0.00221] [0.00249] [0.00303] [0.00311] [0.111]
Constant -3.429*** -2.961*** -4.586*** -4.350*** -184.3***
 [0.444] [0.555] [0.539] [0.539] [26.44]
Observations 7,197 3,214 5,848 5,756 7,546
Wald Chi-squared 786.5 497.1 233.6 233.1 .
Pseudo R_squared 0.416 0.398 0.206 0.198 0.172
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All estimations include a complete set of industry (19) and year (3) dummies. 
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Figure 1: Percentages of participation by industry 
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